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  We develop a model of gross job and worker flows and use it to study how 
the wages, permanent incomes and employment status of individual workers 
evolve over time and how they are affected by aggregate labor market 
conditions. Our model helps explain various other features of labor markets, 
such as the size and persistence of the changes in income that workers 
experience due to displacements or job-to-job transitions, the length of job 
tenures and unemployment duration, and the amount of worker turnover in 
excess of job reallocation. We also examine the effects that labor market 
institutions and public policy have on the gross flows, as well as on the 
resulting wage distribution, employment and aggregate output in the 
equilibrium. From a theoretical point of view, we study the extent to which the 




 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Recent empirical and theoretical studies on gross job and worker ﬂows have changed the way
we think about the labor market. We now know that market economies exhibit high rates of
reallocation of employment across establishments as well as high rates of worker turnover from
one job to another and between employment and unemployment. We now view the number of
employed or unemployed workers as resulting from a large and continual reallocation process
and analyze how changes in public policy and the economic environment aﬀect this process.
The study of the gross ﬂows provides valuable hints on how the labor market carries out this
continual reallocation of resources, and at the same time brings up many interesting questions:
To what extent are market economies able to perform this reallocation process eﬃciently?
H o wi st h i sp r o c e s sa ﬀected by labor market policies? What determines the amount of worker
turnover in excess of job reallocation?
The empirical literature distinguishes between measures of job ﬂows and worker ﬂows. In a
series of inﬂuential studies using US manufacturing census data, Davis and Haltiwanger (1992,
1999) and Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh (1996) measure gross job creation (JCt)a st h es u m
of employment gains over all plants that expand or start up between dates t−1 and t;g r o s sjob
destruction (JDt) as the sum of employment losses over all plants that contract or shut down;
and gross job reallocation as the sum of gross job creation and destruction (JRt = JCt +JDt).
By showing that gross job creation and destruction are both large irrespective of whether
aggregate employment grows or declines, their work highlights the role of heterogeneous forces
that cause employment to expand in some plants and contract in others. Behind these large
job ﬂows, however, there are even larger worker ﬂows.
Estimates of worker ﬂows are based on establishment or worker surveys and measure the
movements of workers across establishments and labor-market states. Empirical studies that
draw on establishment data often deﬁne worker turnover at establishment i (WTit)a st h es u m
of the number of accessions (new hires) and separations (quits and displacements) between dates
2t−1 and t, and aggregate worker turnover (WTt) as the sum of worker turnover over establish-
ments. The number of workers who quit, get displaced, and get hired by each establishment
is at least as large (and often signiﬁcantly larger than) the net change of employment at that
establishment. Burgess, Lane and Stevens (2000) for example, refer to the diﬀerence between
worker turnover and the net employment change as “churning” (Cit = WTit − |eit − eit−1|,
where eit is employment in establishment i at the end of period t). This notion of churning
measures the number of worker transitions in excess of the minimum level needed to achieve
the actual change in employment. Summing over establishments delivers an aggregate measure
of churning: Ct = WTt − JRt.
Alternatively, using data from worker surveys we can deﬁne worker reallocation (WRt)a s
the number of workers who change employment states (i.e., who change place of employment,
or ﬁnd or loose a job, or enter or exit the labor force) between dates t − 1 and t.W o r k e r
turnover measures the number of labor market transitions, while worker reallocation counts the
number of workers who participate in transitions. A worker who moves from one establishment
to another increases the worker reallocation count by one and the aggregate worker turnover
count by two, hence aggregate worker turnover is larger than worker reallocation by the number
of job-to-job transitions.1
Drawing from diﬀerent data sources for job and worker ﬂows, Davis and Haltiwanger (1992)
estimated that job creation and destruction account for no less than one third and no more
than one half of quarterly worker turnover in the US manufacturing sector. New evidence from
datasets that incorporate information on the number of accessions and separations at the es-
tablishment level report that for most establishments, for most of the time, worker turnover is
much larger than job reallocation. For example, Burgess, Lane and Stevens (2000) use data
from all private sector establishments in the state of Maryland and ﬁnd that churning ﬂows
account for 70% of worker turnover in non-manufacturing and about 62% in manufacturing (job
1This is the case provided both the worker-side and establishment-side data sets cover the entire economy.
And also, provided no accessions or separations are reversed within the sample period; else WTt − WR t would
be an upper bound for the number of job-to-job transitions.
3reallocation accounts for the rest). Similarly, based on data derived from the unemployment
insurance systems of eight US states, Anderson and Meyer (1994) report that gross job real-
location only accounts for 24% of quarterly worker turnover in manufacturing. Drawing from
a dataset covering the universe of Danish manufacturing plants, Albæk and Sørensen (1998)
report a ratio of quarterly job reallocation to worker turnover of .42 and ﬁnd that replacement
hiring (deﬁned as accessions minus job creation) is on average 16.5% of manufacturing employ-
ment.2 Hamermesh, Hassink and van Ours (1994) ﬁn dt h a tj o br e a l l o c a t i o ni so n l yo n et h i r d
of worker turnover in a random sample of establishments in the Netherlands. They also ﬁnd
that most mobility is into and out of existing jobs, not to new or from destroyed jobs; that
a large fraction of all hires (separations) take place at ﬁrms where employment is declining
(expanding); and that simultaneous hiring is mostly due to unobservable heterogeneity in the
workforce.
The degree to which worker reallocation exceeds job reallocation depends crucially on the
amount of simultaneous hiring and ﬁring that takes place at the establishment level (as measured
by Cit), as well as on the extent to which job-to-job transitions are a common mechanism
through which the market achieves the reallocation of workers. Recent studies ﬁnd that job-
to-job ﬂows are large: Fallick and Fleischman (2001) estimate that in the US in 1999, on
average four million workers changed employers from one month to the next (about 2.7% of
employment); more than twice the number who transited from employment to unemployment.
T h ef a c tt h a tw o r k e rﬂows exceed job ﬂows at the establishment level is evidence of het-
erogeneity over and above the cross-establishment heterogeneity that can be inferred from the
size of the job ﬂows alone. This suggests that studying the implications of heterogeneity at the
level of the employer-worker match is a necessary step to understand the nature of the process
2Albæk and Sørensen report interesting cross-establishment observations as well. For example, that 62% of
all separations are accounted for by plants with employment growth rates in the interval (−0.3,0.1];a n dt h a t
plants with employment growth rates in the interval (−0.1,0.3] account for 56% of all hires. Burgess, Lane and
Stevens (2000) also present some establishment-level cross-sectional evidence, such as that most of the employers
in their dataset have churning rates above 50% (See their Figure 1 on page 483 which reports the distribution of
Cit/Wit.)
4that reallocates workers and employment positions in actual labor markets.
In this paper, we develop an equilibrium search model that distinguishes between gross
job and worker ﬂows, incorporates job-to-job transitions, and exhibits instances of replacement
hiring.3 We use the model to study how the employment status and wages of individual workers
evolve over time and how they are aﬀected by aggregate labor market conditions. We also
examine the eﬀects that labor market institutions and public policy have on the gross job and
worker ﬂows, as well as on the resulting wage distribution, employment and aggregate output in
the equilibrium. In addition, our model helps explain various other features of labor markets.
For example, why do displaced workers tend to experience a signiﬁcant and persistent fall in
incomes? Why do workers stay unemployed when on-the-job-search is at least as eﬀective as
oﬀ-the-job-search? Why is it that good jobs are not only better paid, but often also more
stable?
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the environment. Section
3d e ﬁnes and characterizes the salient features of the equilibrium. For a special case, Section
4 provides a fuller characterization of the equilibrium set and discusses the main properties of
the allocations. Section 5 incorporates employment protection policies. Section 6 extends the
model to allow for free entry of employers. Section 7 discusses some of the related theoretical
literature on labor market matching models with on-the-job search. Section 8 concludes. The
Appendix contains proofs and explains some properties of the bargaining procedure we propose.
2 The Model
Time is continuous and the horizon is inﬁnite. The economy is populated by a continuum of
ﬁxed and equal numbers of workers and employers.4 We normalize the size of each population
3Job and worker reallocation are one and the same by construction in the workhorse of much of the recent
macro-labor literature, the matching model of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) or Pissarides (2000). And there
is no room for replacement hiring in the inﬂuential on-the-job search model of Burdett and Mortensen (1998).
4Although our main interest here is in the labor market, our model is applicable to any other setting where
bilateral partnerships are relevant, such as the interactions between spouses, or between a tenant and a landlord,
or between a supplier and the buyer of a customized product.
5to unity. Workers and employers are inﬁnitely-lived and risk-neutral. They discount future
utility at rate r>0, and are ex-ante homogeneous in tastes and technology.
A worker meets a randomly chosen employer according to a Poisson process with arrival
rate α. An employer meets a random worker according to the same process. Upon meeting,
the employer-worker pair randomly draws a production opportunity of productivity y,w h i c h
represents the ﬂow net output each agent will produce while matched. (Thus the pair produces
2y.) The random variable y takes one of N distinct values: y1,y 2,...,y N,w h e r e0 <y 1 <y 2 <
...<y N,a n dy = yi with probability πi for i =1 ,...,N,a n d
PN
i=1 πi =1 . For now, we assume
y remains constant for the duration of the match.5
Matched and unmatched agents meet potential partners at the same rate, so when an
employer and a worker meet and draw a productive opportunity each of them may or may not
already be matched with an old production partner. Each worker and employer can form at
most one productive partnership simultaneously. The realization of the random variable y that
an employer and worker draw when they ﬁrst meet is observed without delay by them as well
as by their current partners. In fact, the productivity of the new potential match as well as
the productivities of the existing matches are public information to all the agents involved, i.e.
the worker and the employer who draw the new productivity and their existing partners if they
have any. On the other hand, each agent’s history is private information, except for what is
revealed by the current production match.
When a worker and an employer meet and ﬁnd a new productive opportunity, the pair and
their old partners (if they have any) determine whether or not the new match is formed (and
consequently whether or not the existing matches are destroyed) as well as the once-and-for-
all side payments that each party pays or receives, through a bargaining protocol which we
will describe shortly. Utility is assumed to be transferable among all the agents involved in a
meeting. There is no outside court to enforce any formal contract, so that any eﬀective contract
5In this basic setup, employers and workers are distingu i s e db yt y p eo n l yi nt h a te a c hm a t c hr e q u i r e se x a c t l y
one partner of each type. Below we analyze extensions where employers and workers are diﬀerent in a variety of
ways.
6must be self-enforcing among the parties involved. If the parties who made contact decide
to form a new partnership, they leave their existing partners who then become unmatched.
In addition to these endogenous terminations, we assume any match is subject to exogenous
separation according to a Poisson process with arrival rate δ.
We use nit to denote the measure of matches of productivity yi and n0t to denote the
measure of unmatched employers or workers at date t.L e tτk
ijt be the probability that a worker
with current productivity yi a n da ne m p l o y e rw i t hc u r r e n tp r o d u c t i v i t yyj form a new match
of productivity yk, given that they draw an opportunity to produce yk at time t. (Hereafter,
we will suppress the time subindex when no confusion arises.) The measure of workers in each
state evolves according to:



































The ﬁr s tt e r mo nt h er i g h th a n ds i d eo f( 1 )i st h eﬂow of new matches of productivity yi
created by all types workers and employers. The second term is the total ﬂow of matches with
productivity yi destroyed endogenously when the worker or the employer leaves to form a new
match. The last term is the ﬂow of matches dissolved exogenously. On the right hand side of
equation (2), the ﬁrst term is the ﬂow of workers who become unmatched when their employers
decide to break the current match to form a new match with another worker. The second term
is the ﬂow of workers who become unmatched due to the exogenous dissolution of matches.
The third term is the ﬂow of new matches created by unmatched workers and employers. (The
creation of a new match involving an unmatched agent and a matched agent does not aﬀect
the aggregate number of unmatched agents, since one previously unmatched agent becomes
matched, while one previously matched agent looses the partner to become unmatched.)
Before describing the competitive matching equilibrium with bargaining, we solve the so-
cial planner’s problem. The planner chooses τk






subject to the ﬂow constraints (1) and (2), and initial conditions for n0 and ni for i =1 ,...,N.















ij (λk + λ0 − λi − λj).






=1 if λk + λ0 >λ i + λj
∈ [0,1] if λk + λ0 = λi + λj
=0 if λk + λ0 <λ i + λj
(3)
together with the Euler equations,











(λk + λ0 − λi − λj),












and (1) and (2), for a given initial condition for n0 and ni at date 0. A c c o r d i n gt o( 3 ) ,t o
achieve the optimal allocation the planner speciﬁes that a type i worker and type j employer
should form a new match of productivity yk for sure, if and only if the sum of the shadow
prices of the new match and the unmatched worker and employee (which the new match would
generate) exceeds the sum of the shadow prices of the existing matches of productivity yi and
yj. From (3) we also learn that τk
ij = τk
ji, possibly except for the case of randomized strategies.
Intuitively, there is no inherent asymmetry between a worker and an employer, so the planner
treats them symmetrically in the optimal allocation. These observations allow us to summarize
the ﬁrst order necessary conditions as:









ij (λk + λ0 − λi − λj) (4)









0j (λk − λj). (5)
83 Competitive Matching Equilibrium
In this section we characterize the competitive matching equilibrium with the following bar-
gaining procedure. When an agent draws an opportunity to produce with a new partner, with
probability a half, she makes take-it-or-leave-it oﬀers to her new potential partner and her old
partner (if she has one) about production and side payments. She can rank these two oﬀers, by
making her oﬀer to the old partner contingent on her oﬀer to the new potential partner being
rejected. With another probability half, her new potential partner and her old partner (if she
has one) simultaneously make take-it-or-leave-it oﬀers to her. After these oﬀers are made, the
recipient of the oﬀers chooses which one to accept. We also specify that matched agents split
the surplus symmetrically as long as neither agent encounters a production opportunity with
another potential partner.6
Because a worker and an employer who form a match are inherently symmetric, hereafter we
restrict our attention to symmetric equilibria in which workers and employers are treated sym-
metrically and are distinguished only by the productivity of their current match (or unmatched
state). We will refer to a match of productivity yi as a “type i match”, and call a worker or an
employer in a type i match a “type i agent”. Let Vi be the value of expected discounted utility
of a type i agent (either a worker or employer), and let V0 be the value of an unmatched agent.
Let Xk
ij be the value that a type i agent oﬀers to a type j agent in order to form (or preserve) a
match of productivity yk.S p e c i ﬁcally, Xk
ij includes the value of the new match plus the net side
payment type j agent receives. Three qualitatively diﬀerent types of meetings can result from
the random matching process: (i) an unmatched employer and an unmatched worker meet and
draw a production opportunity, (ii) a matched agent and an unmatched agent meet and draw
a production opportunity, and (iii) a matched employer and a matched worker meet and draw
a production opportunity. We begin by describing the equilibrium outcome of the bargaining
for each of these three types of meetings, taking Vi and V0 as given. Later, we will analyze how
6Alternatively, we can think of the matched pair without an outside production opportunity as being involved
in continual negotiations by which the expected value of side payments net out to be zero.
9these values are determined in equilibrium.
(i). An unmatched employer meets an unmatched worker.
Suppose an unemployed worker and an employer with a vacancy draw an opportunity for
each to produce yk. Since both are unmatched, the outside option to each agent is V0.T h i s
case is illustrated in Figure 1, where we have named the two agents involved in this meeting A
and B.
Figure 1: An unmatched employer meets an unmatched worker.
The bargaining unfolds as follows:
Subgame 1. With probability a half, the employer makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer Xk
AB to
the worker in order to maximize her own utility (which minimizes his partner’s utility) subject
to the constraint that his partner will accept. Then Xk
AB = V0,a n dt h eo ﬀer is accepted by the
partner.
Subgame 2. With the same probability, the worker makes an oﬀer Xk
BA = V0 to the employer
which is again accepted.
Let Πj be the expected payoﬀ to agent j = A,B and Γj be her expected gain. For this case
we have ΠA = ΠB = 1
2V0 + 1
2(2Vk − V0)=Vk,a n d
ΓA = ΓB = Vk − V0. (6)
10In this symmetric situation the expected value of the side payment is zero, and both unmatched
agents enjoy the same capital gains to becoming matched.
(ii). An matched agent meets an unmatched agent.
Suppose agent B, who is currently in a match of productivity yi with agent A, meets agent
C —who is unmatched— and they draw a productive opportunity yk. This situation is illustrated
in Figure 2.
Figure 2: A matched agent meets an unmatched agent.
The bargaining proceeds as follows:
Subgame 1. With probability a half, B makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to A or C.T h i s
oﬀer involves payoﬀs as well as a proposal to engage in joint production. If B was to oﬀer
(continued) joint production to A,h ew o u l do ﬀer A her minimum acceptable payoﬀ, Xk
BA = V0.
A would accept the oﬀer and B’s payoﬀ from continued production with A would be 2Vi − V0.
Alternatively, if B oﬀers joint production to C,t h e nh ew i l lo ﬀer C ap a y o ﬀ equal to her
minimum acceptable level, Xk
BC = V0. C will accept the oﬀer and B’s payoﬀ would be 2Vk−V0.
So clearly, if Vk >V i then B oﬀers C to produce together, she accepts, and the payoﬀst oA,
B and C will be V0, 2Vk − V0,a n dV0 respectively. Conversely, if Vi >V k,t h e nB oﬀers A to
11continue to produce together, she accepts, and the payoﬀst oA, B and C will be V0, 2Vi − V0,
and V0.
Subgame 2. With probability another half, A and C simultaneously make oﬀers to B. Because
A’s outside option is the value of being unmatched, V0,t h em a x i m u mA is willing to oﬀer to
B to continue matching with productivity yi is 2Vi − V0, (this oﬀer leaves A with a payoﬀ
of V0). Similarly, the maximum C is willing to oﬀer B in order to form a new match with
productivity yk is 2Vk − V0.S i n c e A and C take each other’s oﬀer as given, the competition
becomes Bertrand, so A oﬀers B’s payoﬀ to be Xi
AB =m i n ( 2 Vi−V0,2Vk −V0+ε),a n dC oﬀers
B’s payoﬀ to be Xk
CB =m i n ( 2 Vi − V0 + ε,2Vk − V0),w h e r eε is an arbitrarily small positive
number. Thus, if Vk >V i,t h e nB accepts C’s oﬀer to form a new match and the payoﬀst oA,
B and C will be V0, 2Vi − V0 and 2Vk − 2Vi + V0 respectively. On the other hand, if Vi >V k,
then B accepts A’s oﬀer to continue the existing match and the payoﬀst oA, B and C will be
2Vi − 2Vk + V0, 2Vk − V0 and V0.
Notice that regardless of whether it is B who makes the take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to A or C
(subgame 1), or A and C who make the oﬀers to B (subgame 2), B leaves A for C for sure if
and only if Vk >V i; that is when the value of the new match exceeds the value of the existing














,i fVi <V k. (7)
Notice that through the side payment of transferable utility, the expected gains to the agents
who form the new match is equal to the capital gains to their new partner instead of the own
capital gains: the gains to B and C are Vk − V0 and Vk − Vi respectively.
On the other hand, if the value of the existing match exceeds the value of the new match,
Vi >V k, then regardless of whether it is B or A and C who make the oﬀers, B preserves the














,i fVk <V i. (8)
12Although the current match is not destroyed, the old partner, A, has to transfer the expected
value of utility Vk −V0 to B in order to persuade him to stay in the current match. The reason
for this transfer is that Vk − V0 is the expected gain for B to form a new match with C (see
(7)), so it is also the opportunity cost for B to continue the existing match.
(iii). A matched employer meets a matched worker.
Suppose agent B and agent C meet and draw a productive opportunity yk.T h es i t u a t i o n
now is that B is currently in a match of productivity yi with agent A,w h i l eC, is currently in
a match of productivity yj with agent D. This case is illustrated in Figure 3.
Figure 3: A matched employer meets a matched worker.
The bargaining procedure is as follows:
Subgame 1. With probability a half, A and C simultaneously make oﬀers to B. C also
makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to his existing partner D,a n dt h i so ﬀer is contingent on his
oﬀer to B being rejected. C makes the smallest acceptable oﬀer to D, and since D has no other
productive opportunities, his proposed payoﬀ to D is equal to the value of being unmatched,
V0. The resulting payoﬀ to C from continuing to match with D is 2Vj − V0, which constitutes
the opportunity cost for C to form a new match. Thus the maximum C is willing to oﬀer B
13is 2Vk − (2Vj − V0). Because A’s opportunity cost of continuing to match is the value of being
unmatched, V0,t h em a x i m u mA is willing to oﬀer B is 2Vi−V0. Since this valuation is positive,
A will want to make sure that B ﬁnds her oﬀer acceptable, and for this she must ensure that B’s
payoﬀ is at least as large as V0.T h e r e f o r e ,A oﬀers B’s payoﬀ to be Xi
AB = Max{V0,Min[2Vi−
V0,2Vk−(2Vj−V0)+ε]} and C oﬀers B’s payoﬀ to be Xk
CB = Min[2Vi−V0+ε,2Vk−(2Vj−V0)]
for an arbitrarily small positive ε. Then, B will accept C’s oﬀer to form the new match if and
only if 2Vk −(2Vj −V0) > 2Vi −V0,o rVk +V0 >V i +Vj, i.e., the sum of the values of the new
match and the unmatched exceeds the sum of the values of the existing matches.
If Vk <V i + Vj − V0,t h e nA and B preserve their match and whether or not A may have
to oﬀer B a side-payment depends on whether the new potential match of B and C is better
or worse than C’s current match. If the new potential match is better (i.e. Vj <V k), then C is
willing to oﬀer B as much as 2Vk − (2Vj − V0) >V 0 to convince him to leave A, and therefore
A has to “bid C away” by giving B a side-payment equal to C’s valuation of B.H o w e v e r ,i f
Vk <V j,t h e nC is willing to oﬀer B no more than V0 +2( Vk − Vj) <V 0. But since B can
always get V0 on his own, in this case C’s oﬀer poses no threat to A who only has to transfer
utility V0 to B to convince him to preserve their current match.
Subgame 2. With probability another half, B and D simultaneously make oﬀers to C. B also
makes an oﬀer to his existing partner, A,a n dt h i so ﬀer is contingent on his oﬀer to C being
rejected. The analysis is identical to that of subgame 1 up to a relabelling so we omit it. (To
get the equilibrium payoﬀss i m p l yr e p l a c eA with D, B with C,a n di with j in the payoﬀso f
subgame 1.)
In the two possible sequences of bargaining (subgame 1 and subgame 2) we see that B and
C abandon their old partners to form a new match for sure if and only if the sum of the value
of the new match and the unmatched exceeds the sum of two existing matches. Without loss
















































































,i fVk <V i. (12)
In (9), when B and C form a new match, the equilibrium expected side payment is such that
the expected gains to each of them is equal to the capital gains to the new partner, instead of
their own capital gain.7 In (10), although the existing matches continue, the old partner must
on average pay her current partner his opportunity cost of giving up the option to form a new
match. In (11), because the value of the new potential match is not as large as the value of
existing match between C and D, A has no need to pay a side payment to B on average in
order to persuade him to stay in the existing match. But in expectation, D still needs to pay
as i d ep a y m e n tt oC in order to preserve their valuable match. In (12) the value of the new
potential match between B and C is so small that on average A d o e sn o th a v et om a k eas i d e
payment to B and D does not have to make a side payment to C.
We summarize the main features of the bargaining outcomes in Proposition 1. The proof
of parts (a) and (b) follows from the previous discussion. Part (c) is proved in the Appendix
which also contains a graphical analysis of the bargaining procedure.
7If B and C were to form a new match and there were no side payements, then B would gain Vk − Vi and C
would gain Vk − Vj, but the equilibrium side payments imply that these gains are swaped: B gains Vk − Vj and
C gains Vk −Vi. So when a new match is formed, the agent who is currently in the better match enjoys a larger
capital gain.
15Proposition 1 For given value functions, the matching decisions and side payments are uniquely
determined in the symmetric competitive matching equilibrium through the sequence of bilateral
bargaining. Moreover,
(a) When two agents ﬁnd an opportunity to form a new match, whether or not they form the
new match abandoning their existing matches (if any) depends on whether or not the sum of
the values of new match and the unmatched exceeds the total value of the existing matches.
(b) Through the side payment, the expected net gain to the agent who forms a new match is
equal to the capital gains of the new partner (instead of his own capital gains).
(c) The equilibrium outcomes (and expected outcomes) induced by the sequence of bilateral bar-
gaining lie in the core.
In the equilibrium, the agents expected payoﬀs satisfy the following Bellman equations:
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− δ (Vi − V0)
for i =1 ,...,N,a n d












Here, type i agent’s choice of whether or not to form a new match with type j agent is repre-
sented by φk
ij ∈ [0,1].T y p e i agent’s value function also depends upon his existing partner’s
choices, represented by b φ
k
ij and b zk
ij.W ea r eu s i n gsk
ij to denote the net expected side payment
that the agent in the type i m a t c hw h om e ta na g e n ti nat y p ej match oﬀers her to convince
her to form a new match with productivity yk.N o t et h a tsk
ji = −sk
ij.A l s o ,w el e tzk
ij be the
expected side payment that type i agent oﬀers his old partner to persuade her to stay in the
o l dm a t c hi n s t e a do ff o r m i n gan e wt y p ek match with an agent who is currently in a type j
match.
16A competitive matching equilibrium with bargaining is characterized by a set of value func-




i,j=0,k=1 together with a
population distribution of partnerships (ni)
N
i=0 such that: (i) Each agent with the opportunity
to make an oﬀer chooses how much side payment to oﬀer to her potential partners, and the
recipient of the oﬀer chooses whether to accept or reject, in order to maximize her expected
discounted utility, taking the strategies of the other agents and the population distribution of
partnerships as given; (ii) The strategies of the other agents and the population distribution
are equilibrium strategies and distribution.
From part (a) of Proposition 1 we know that φk
ij = φk
ji,a n dt h a tφk
ij =1if Vk+V0 >V i+Vj,
φk
ij =0if Vk+V0 <V i+Vj,a n dφk
ij ∈ [0,1] if Vk+V0 = Vi+Vj. And from part (b) of Proposition
1 we know that if φk
ij =1 ,t h e nVk + sk






ij in a symmetric equilibrium, the value functions reduce to









ij (Vk + V0 − Vi − Vj) − δ (Vi − V0)









0j (Vk − Vj).
Let us deﬁne the value of a match to the pair, λc
i =2 Vi for i =0 ,1,...,N.T h e n w eﬁnd the
value of the match to the pair satisﬁes:
rλc
i − ˙ λ
c































The competitive matching equilibrium can be summarized by a list (λc
i,φ k
ij,n i) for i,j =0 ,...,N
and k =1 ,...,N that satisﬁes (13), (14), and the laws of motion (1) and (2). Notice that the
equilibrium value of the match to the pair satisﬁes very similar conditions to the ones that the
shadow price of the match must satisfy for a social optimum. In fact, conditions (13) and (14)
would be identical to (4) and (5), were it not for the fact that in the optimality conditions there
17is a “2” in front of the contact rate α.T h i sd i ﬀerence is due to a search (or match-formation)
externality: in the decentralized economy, an individual agent does not take into account the
impact that her decisions to form and destroy matches have on the arrival of opportunities
of the other agents. Although the arrival rate of any new opportunity is constant here, the
arrival rate of a new opportunity with a particular type of agent is proportional to the measure
of agents of that type. Also, whether or not a new match is formed depends not only on the
quality of the new potential match, but also on the types of the existing matches. Therefore,
the relevant meeting rate is quadratic, because the total number of contacts between type i
agents and type j agents is equal to αninj.8
The relationship between the equilibrium match values and the planner’s shadow prices can
also be recasted as follows. Deﬁne µi = λi − λ0 and µc
i = λc
i − λc
0. Then from (4), (5), (13),
and (14), and focusing on time invariant paths, we have:










































Observe that if we modify the planner’s problem replacing r in (15) with r0 =2 r + δ,t h e n
the ﬁrst order conditions of this modiﬁed planner’s problem are identical to the equilibrium
condition for the competitive matching equilibrium, except that all ﬂow outputs yi all appear
multiplied by half for the planner. But a proportional change of all output levels yi just induces









i=1. We summarize these results as follows:
Proposition 2 A competitive matching equilibrium exists. Moreover, all steady-state competi-
tive matching equilibria satisfy the ﬁrst order conditions of a modiﬁed social planner’s problem,
8Mortensen (1982) shows that “mating models” in which an agent’s decisions aﬀect other agents’ meeting
probabilities typically fail to achieve the socially optimal allocation due to a search externality.
18in which the subjective interest rate, r, is replaced by the higher rate r0 =2 r + δ,w h e r eδ is
the exogenous destruction rate of any match. The allocation that solves the modiﬁed planner’s
problem can be decentralized as a competitive matching equilibrium.
4A S p e c i a l C a s e
Consider the model with a ﬁxed population of employers and N =2 . For this case the ﬂow
conditions (1) and (2) reduce to
˙ n2 = απ
¡
n2




˙ n1 = α(1 − π)n2
0 − 2απn0n1 − 2απn2
1φ − δn1
˙ n0 = δ (n1 + n2)+απn2
1φ − αn2
0.
As long as the value function is increasing in the productivity of the current match (V0 <V 1 <
V2), we know that φ2
0j =1for j =0 ,1 and that φk
i2 =0for i =0 ,1,2 and k =1 ,2.T os i m p l i f y
notation, we are letting φ = φ2
11 and π = π2 (thus π1 =1− π). Figure 4 illustrates the worker
ﬂows.
Figure 4: Worker ﬂows for the case of N =2 .
The following lemma characterizes the steady state distribution of matches taking as given
19the separation decision φ.
Lemma 1 A unique steady state distribution of workers exists for any given φ ∈ [0,1].T h e
number of unemployed workers, n0, solves
£
αn2





2δ (1 − n0) − α(1 + π)n2
0
¤2 =0 .




f (n0), and the number of workers employed in matches with productivity y2 is n2 =1−n0−n1.
Proof. See the Appendix.
In a stationary equilibrium the value functions satisfy:
rV2 = y2 − δ (V2 − V0)
rV1 = y1 − δ (V1 − V0)+αn0π (V2 − V1)+αn1πφ(V2 + V0 − 2V1)
rV0 = αn0 [π (V2 − V0)+( 1− π)(V1 − V0)] + αn1π(V2 − V1).
From Proposition 1 we know that φ =1with certainty if and only if V2 + V0 − 2V1 > 0.W e




α[πn1 +( 1− π)n0]
r + δ + α(n0 + πn1)
, (17)
where n0 and n1 are the steady state numbers of matches characterized in Lemma 1. Since
the right hand side of (17) is bounded, it is clear that φ =1with certainty for y2/y1 large
enough. In these cases, the agents involved will destroy two middle-productivity matches in
order to form a single high-productivity match whenever the opportunity arises. Perhaps more
surprisingly, notice that there is always some x>0 such that φ =1for all y2/y1 > 2−x.T h a t
is, there may be instances in which two middle-productivity matches are destroyed to form
a single high-productivity match even if this entails a reduction in current output. To ﬁnd a
stationary equilibrium, let ni (φ) denote the steady state number of matches of productivity yi as





2.F r o mt h i sw es e et h a tφ =1is an equilibrium if Φ(1) > 0, φ =0is an equilibrium if Φ(0) < 0
and φ∗ ∈ [0,1] is an equilibrium if Φ(φ∗)=0 . The equilibrium map Φ is continuous on [0,1],
so there always exists a stationary equilibrium. However, an equilibrium is not always unique,
leading to the possibility of coordination failure. We can show a suﬃcient condition for the





y1 ≥ 2 (thus having π ≥ 1
3 guarantees uniqueness). In what follows, we continue the discussion
for the case of unique equilibrium.
Given (17), Proposition 2 tells us that the social planner chooses to destroy a pair of matches




2α[πn1 +( 1− π)n0]
r + δ +2 α(n0 + πn1)
, (18)
with n0 and n1 given by Lemma 1. Notice that also here, there are instances in which the planner
chooses to destroy two matches of productivity y1 to create a single match of productivity y2 at
the cost of reducing current output. Both in the competitive equilibrium and in the planner’s
solution the basic logic for this result goes as follows. Although unmatched agents generate
zero current output, they generate a positive expected discounted value of output. Hence for
some parametrizations (e.g. y2/y1 slightly below 2), the planner may choose to reduce current
output as a form of investment, in order to increase future output. From a static point of view,
this may come as a surprise since unmatched agents are unproductive; but from the planner’s
dynamic perspective, unmatched agents are a valued input in the matching process that makes
production possible. This intuition can be formalized by noticing that both (17) and (18)
approach y2/y1 > 2 as r becomes large. The higher the degree of impatience, the less willing
the planner is to trade oﬀ current for future production.
From (17) and (18) we also learn that failing to internalize the search externality makes
atomistic agents less willing to destroy middlem a t c h e sr e l a t i v et ot h ep l a n n e r .T h er e a s o ni s
that the shadow value the planner assigns to a pair of unmatched agents is larger than their value
21in the competitive equilibrium (because the planner also imputes as part of their return the fact
that the unmatched pair helps other agents climb the productivity ladder). Alternatively, recall
that from Proposition 2 we know that the competitive matching equilibrium corresponds to a
modiﬁed planner’s economy with higher discount rate r0 =2 r+δ. Thus the modiﬁed planner is
less willing to trade oﬀ current for future output. Consequently, the modiﬁed planner (or agents
in the competitive matching equilibrium) is less willing to trade two matches of productivity
y1 for two agents in a match of productivity y2 and two unmatched agents. Figure 5 illustrates
the diﬀerence between the relevant destruction margins in the eﬃcient and the competitive
solutions. On the horizontal axis is r, a measure of impatience, and on the vertical axis y2/y1,
the relevant measure of inequality in instantaneous productivities. Notice that the (n0,n 1) pair
that appears in (17) is identical to that in (18) and is independent of y1, y2 and r.( S e eL e m m a
1.) The solid lines with the higher and lower intercepts are conditions (17) and (18) at equality
Figure 5: Destruction regions for the case with N =2 .
22respectively. As in the competitive economy, we know that for the social planner’s economy
τ2
0j =1for j =0 ,1;t h a tτk
i2 =0for i =0 ,1,2 and k =1 ,2 and therefore we use τ to denote
τ2
11, the only nontrivial decision.
Double breaches occur in the competitive equilibrium only for parametrizations that lie
above the higher solid line. In contrast, the planner implements double breaches for para-
metrizations that lie above the lower solid line. For any given degree of impatience r,t h e
competitive and the eﬃcient allocations coincide only if the ﬂow productivity diﬀerential y2/y1
is either large enough (i.e. above the higher solid line) or small enough (below the lower solid
line). For intermediate values (i.e. those that lie between the two solid lines) the allocations
diﬀer: relative to the eﬃcient benchmark, matches of productivity y1 are too stable in the
competitive economy.
It is possible to design policies that bring the competitive allocation in line with their
eﬃcient allocation. For example, suppose every agent receives a payoﬀ b>0 while unmatched,
and that this transfer is paid for by levying a tax T from every match.9 The balanced-budget
condition is bn0 = T (n1 + n2). The Bellman equations for the competitive economy become
rˆ V2 = y2 − T − δ(ˆ V2 − ˆ V0)
rˆ V1 = y1 − T − δ(ˆ V1 − ˆ V0)+αn0π(ˆ V2 − ˆ V1)+αn1πφ(ˆ V2 + ˆ V0 − 2ˆ V1)
rˆ V0 = b + αn0
h
π(ˆ V2 − ˆ V0)+( 1− π)(ˆ V1 − ˆ V0)
i
+ αn1π(ˆ V2 − ˆ V1).
Notice that for a given destruction decision φ, the stationary distribution of agents across
states is still as described in Lemma 1. However, now φ =1with certainty if and only if
ˆ V2 + ˆ V0 − 2ˆ V1 > 0, which can be rewritten as
y2 − T − b
y1 − T − b
> 2 −
α[πn1 +( 1− π)n0]
r + δ + α(n0 + πn1)
.
9For the discussion of this section we will ignore the issue of exactly how a government may be able to collect
taxes from agents in a random matching economy, as well as why the same government is unable to facilitate
the matching process.






α[πn1 +( 1− π)n0]
r + δ + α(n0 + πn1)
. (19)
O b s e r v et h a ti fw el e tT = T∗,w h e r e
T∗ =
αn0 (r + δ)[πn1 +( 1− π)n0]
[r + δ +2 α(n0 + πn1)](r + δ + απn0)
y1,
then (18) and (19) coincide. In other words, the compensation b∗ = n1+n2
n0 T∗ makes agents
internalize the search externality in the competitive matching equilibrium and implements the
same destruction decisions as the planner’s. Quite intuitively, note that b∗ approaches zero as
either r →∞or y1 → 0.
The model has clear predictions regarding individual agents’ employment histories and the
various attributes of diﬀerent types of jobs. For example, a job of productivity y2 is not
only better paid, but also more stable than a job of productivity y1.T h e ﬁrst observation is
immediate because y2 >y 1 (and, in fact, also V2 >V 1). The second follows from the fact that
the expected time until a worker gets displaced is 1
δ for a job of productivity y2 and 1
δ+απ(n0+φn1)
for a job of productivity y1. Displacement from a job with productivity i is associated with
a capital loss equal to Vi − V0, and it takes workers some time to climb back up to a job of
productivity equal or higher to the one they were displaced from. For example, suppose a
worker is displaced from a job of productivity y1 (i.e. his match is either hit by the exogenous
destruction shock δ,o rh i se m p l o y e rﬁres him in order to form a new match of productivity y2
with another worker). The expected time it takes this worker to ﬁnd a job at least as good as
the one he lost is 1
α(n0+φπn1). Note that the degree of inequality (say as measured by Vi − Vj)
as well as the shapes of the various hazard rates depend crucially on the separation decisions φ.
Therefore, we can expect these variables to vary systematically across economies with diﬀerent
labor-market policies that aﬀect this endogenous destruction margin.
We can also construct the theoretical counterparts to the usual empirical measures of job
and worker ﬂows. Let JC, JD, WR and WT denote job creation, job destruction, worker
24reallocation and worker turnover in the stationary equilibrium. Then we have
JC = α(n0 + πn1)n0
JD = απ(n0 + φn1)n1 + δ (n1 + n2)
WR = αn0n0 +2 αn0n1π + αn1n0π +2 αn1n1πφ+ δ (n1 + n2)
WT = αn0n0 +2 αn0n1π +2 αn1n0π +3 αn1n1πφ+ δ (n1 + n2).
Job creation includes all those unmatched employers who meet and start productive relation-
ships with either unmatched or matched workers. Job destruction consists of all those ﬁlled
jobs which become unﬁlled. This occurs every time an employed worker quits to form a better
match with another employer and also when the match is destroyed for exogenous reasons. It
can be veriﬁed that, naturally, JC − JD =0since the net employment change is zero in the
steady state. Worker reallocation counts the number of workers who change state. In the ﬁrst
term are the number of unemployed workers who ﬁll vacant jobs. In the second term are the
unemployed workers who contact a ﬁlled job and get hired. The “2” multiplying this term
accounts for the change of state of the previously employed worker who gets displaced. The
third term represents the number of previously employed workers who contact a vacant job
and quit to form a more productive relationship. The fourth term accounts for the number of
workers who are employed and quit to form a new match with an employer who was previously
matched to another worker, as well as for the corresponding displaced workers. The number of
workers who change state (i.e. become unemployed) for exogenous reasons are accounted for
in the last term. The measure of worker turnover counts the total number of accessions and
separations over all employers.
Notice that the gross job and worker ﬂows satisfy:
WR = JC+ JD+ απ(n0 + φn1)n1
WT = WR+ απn0n1 + απn1n1φ.
In the model —as in the data— gross worker reallocation is larger than gross job reallocation,
25JC + JD. Instances of “replacement hiring” are behind this discrepancy, since job creation
and destruction are unchanged when a ﬁrm ﬁres a worker to replace him with an unemployed
one. But also, in economies in which φ>0, there is yet another reason for worker reallocation
in excess of job reallocation, since when a matched employer and an employed worker decide
to form a new match the worker reallocation count increases by 2 while job reallocation only
increases by 1 (job creation is unchanged by this transition).10 Workers who experience job-to-
job transitions get counted twice in the aggregate measure of worker turnover, so the number
of job-to-job transitions, απn0n1 + απn1n1φ, is the amount by which worker turnover exceeds
worker reallocation.
5 Employment Protection
In this section we introduce two broad sets of employment protection policies. The ﬁrst consists
of policies specifying that the agent who breaks up a match is to compensate her old partner
for the loss she inﬂicts on him. The second set of policies diﬀer in that the party that initiates
the separation must pay the “government” a ﬁring tax, and the government then oﬀers the
displaced agent a compensation.
5.1 Firing Compensation
We begin by studying the bargaining procedure in the presence of a policy that speciﬁes the
agent who leaves a relationship must pay compensatory damages to the old partner. Because
ﬁring compensation are a pure transfer among partners, it does not change the total surplus
of the alternative matches of all the members involved. One expects that the Coase theorem
will hold, so that the decision to form a new match continues to be privately eﬃcient; i.e.
eﬃcient for all the parties involved in the meeting, given the value functions. More subtle is
the eﬀect that ﬁring compensation will have on the value functions themselves. Consider the
10Several recent empirical studies argue that distinguising between job and worker ﬂo w si se s s e n t i a lf o ra
complete characterization of aggregate labor-market dynamics. See Fallick and Fleischman (2001), Nagypál
(2003) and Stewart (2002).
26single-breach situation illustrated in Figure 2 and let Tk
i0 ≤ Vi − V0 be the compensation that
B must pay A should he leave to form a new productive relationship with C.A s u s u a l , t h e
bargaining procedure is composed of two subgames.
Subgame 1. With probability a half, B makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer specifying con-
tinuation payoﬀs as well as a proposal to engage in joint production to either A or C.I f B
was to oﬀer continued joint production to A,h ew o u l do ﬀer A her minimum acceptable payoﬀ,
Xk
BA = V0 + Tk
i0.A g e n t A would accept the oﬀer and B’s payoﬀ from continued production
with A would then be 2Vi − V0 − Tk
i0. Alternatively, if B was to oﬀer joint production to C
he would oﬀer her Xk
BC = V0, her minimum acceptable continuation value. C would accept
this oﬀer and B’s payoﬀ after paying the ﬁring compensation to A would be 2Vk − V0 − Tk
i0.I f
Vk >V i then B will choose to leave A and form a new match with C. The payoﬀst oA, B and
C will be V0 + Tk
i0, 2Vk − V0 − Tk
i0,a n dV0 respectively. Alternatively, if Vk <V i,t h e nB will
oﬀer continued production to A and the payoﬀst oA, B and C will be V0 +Tk
i0, 2Vi −V0 −Tk
i0,
and V0.
Subgame 2. With probability another half, A and C simultaneously make oﬀers to B.
Since A’s outside option is now V0 + Tk
i0, she is willing to oﬀer B no more than 2Vi − V0 − Tk
i0.
On the other hand, the maximum C is willing to oﬀer B is 2Vk − V0. Therefore A oﬀers B
a continuation payoﬀ Xi




2Vi − V0 − Tk






is for B’s continuation payoﬀ to be Xk
CB =m i n
¡
2Vk − V0 − Tk




an arbitrarily small positive number.11 If Vk >V i then B forms a new match with C and the
payoﬀst oA, B and C are V0+Tk
i0, 2Vi−V0−Tk
i0,a n d2Vk−(2Vi − V0) respectively. Conversely,
if Vk <V i then B stays matched to A and the payoﬀst oA, B and C are 2Vi−
¡




2Vk − V0 − Tk
i0,a n dV0 respectively.
In both subgames B leaves A for sure if and only if Vk >V i. In this case the expected
11The compensation T
k
i0 appears subtracting from the second argument of the “min” in X
k
AB and from the
ﬁrst argument of the “min” in X
k
CB because when C transfers 2Vk − V0 to B,i fB matches with C he only gets
2Vk − V0 − T
k
ij after settling the ﬁring compensation with A.T h e“ m a x ”i nX
k
CB ensures that A never oﬀers B
a continuation payoﬀ below V0 even in instances where C’s valuation of B,i . e .2Vk − V0,i sl e s st h a nV0 + T
k
i0.
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If Vk <V 0+Tk
i0,t h e nB remains matched to A and is unable to extract a positive expected side-
payment from her: all agents’ continuation payoﬀs remain unchanged and nobody experiences
capital gains or losses. Note that if the policy requires the partner who leaves to pay fully
compensatory damages to her old partner, i.e. if Tk
i0 = Vi −V0 for all i and k,t h e nΓB = ΓC =
Vk − Vi and ΓA =0in those cases in which B chooses to form a new match with C.I nt h o s e
cases in which V0+Ti0 ≤ Vk ≤ Vi , A transfers ΓB = Vk−Vi to B and persuades him to preserve
their current match.
Next, we consider the double-breach situation illustrated in Figure 3 and let Tk
ij ≤ Vi − V0
be the compensation that B must pay A should he leave to form a new productive relationship
with C. Similarly, Tk
ji ≤ Vj − V0 is the compensation that C must pay D should she leave to
form a new productive relationship with B.
Subgame 1. With probability a half, A and C simultaneously make oﬀers to B. C also
makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to his existing partner D,a n dt h i so ﬀer is contingent on his
oﬀer to B being rejected. C makes the smallest acceptable oﬀer to D,n a m e l yV0 + Tk
ji.T h e
resulting payoﬀ to C from continuing to match with D is 2Vj − V0 − Tk
ji, which constitutes
the opportunity cost for C to form a new match. Thus the maximum payoﬀ C is willing to
assign to B is 2Vk − Tk
ij − Tk
ji − (2Vj − V0 − Tk
ji).I fB “ﬁres” A,t h e nA’s continuation payoﬀ
is V0 + Tk
ij.T h u st h em a x i m u mA is willing to oﬀer B is 2Vi −V0 − Tk
ij. Since this valuation is
positive (recall that Tk
ij ≤ Vi −V0), A will want to make sure that B ﬁnds her oﬀer acceptable,




ij+ε]} and C oﬀers
28B’s payoﬀ to be Xk
CB = Min[2Vk −(2Vj −V0)−Tk
ij,2Vi −V0 −Tk
ij +ε] for an arbitrarily small
positive ε. Then, B will accept C’s oﬀer to form the new match if and only if Vk+V0 >V i+Vj.
Subgame 2. With probability another half, B and D simultaneously make oﬀers to C. B
also makes an oﬀer to his current partner A,a n dt h i so ﬀer is contingent on his oﬀer to C being
rejected. This subgame is identical to subgame 1 up to a relabeling so we omit the analysis.
In the two possible sequences of bargaining (subgame 1 and subgame 2) B and C abandon
their old partners to form a new match for sure if and only if the sum of the value of the new















−(Vi − V0 − Tk
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     

,i fVk ≤ Vi + Vj − V0.
If Vk <V j + Tk
ij,t h e nB remains matched to A and is unable to use his meeting with C to
extract a side-payment from A. Similarly, C is unable to extract a side-payment from D if
Vk <V i + Tk
ji. Note that if the policy requires the partner who breaks the match to pay fully
compensatory damages to her old partner, i.e. if Tk
ij = Vi − V0 for all i, j and k,t h e nA and
D never suﬀer any capital losses (or equivalently, B and C never experience capital gains). By
construction, the policy ensures A and D suﬀer no losses when their matches are destroyed by
their partners, but as it turns out, this policy will also spare them from having to make side
payments to prevent their respective partners from leaving in those cases in which B and C
have the option of forming a match of type k with Vk ≤ Vi + Vj − V0.
To conclude, we return to the value functions to see how the policies aﬀect the equilibrium
29payoﬀs associated with each state:












































− δ (Vi − V0)
for i =1 ,...,N,a n d






0j (Vk − Vj).
In a symmetric equilibrium b φ
k
ij = φk
ij, and these expressions reduce to (13) and (14). We
s u m m a r i z et h i sr e s u l ta sf o l l o w s .
Proposition 3 Policies that require the partner who breaks the relationship to (either partially
or fully) compensate the old partner are completely neutral: they have no eﬀect on payoﬀsn o r
on match formation and dissolution decisions.
Thus ﬁring compensation not only has no eﬀect on the new match formation decisions given
the value functions, but also has no eﬀect on the value functions themselves.
5.2 Firing Taxes
We now report the main results for the case of a policy specifying that the agent who leaves
a relationship must pay a tax. (See the Appendix for details.) We still use Tk
ij ≤ Vi − V0 to
denote the tax that an agent currently in a type i match who forms a new type k m a t c hw i t ha n
agent who was previously in a type j match must pay for separating from his current partner.
The diﬀerence with the previous case is that this “ﬁring tax” is paid out to some external party
(e.g. a “government”); i.e. it is not directly transferred to the old partner. We allow for the
possibility that the breached against partner receives compensation Sk
ij ≤ Vi − V0 from the
government. The key is that although Tk
ij and Sk
ij will typically be related through some overall
government budget constraint, they need not be equal to each other.12









ij if the proceeds from the ﬁring taxes are also used to pay for other programs.
30Firing taxes will in general alter the match formation and destruction decisions. Summariz-
ing, in the single-breach situation of Figure 2, B will destroy his match with A to form a new
one with C i fa n do n l yi f






> 2Vi + V0.
And in the double-breach situation of Figure 3 B and C leave their current partners if and only
if








> 2Vi +2 Vj.
Imposing high ﬁring taxes on the agents who “ﬁre” their partners tends to make existing matches
more stable while generous government transfers to the displaced agents makes existing matches
more likely to be destroyed. What matters for the creation and destruction decisions is how
much all the members involved in a meeting (including the agents who get ﬁred) pay in net
to the government. So if the government increases the payments of the private agents, say by
imposing a more stringent administrative procedure for ﬁring, then the simultaneous creation
(of new matches) and destruction of (old) matches will decrease further. To conclude, turn to
the value functions to see how the policies aﬀect the equilibrium payoﬀs associated with each




the Bellman equations are:










































The policy that requires each agent who breaks a match to directly compensate her old partner
corresponds to the special case with Tk
ij = Sk
ij for all i, j and k and is completely neutral as
shown previously.13
13The idea that government-mandated transfers between the employer and the worker can be oﬀset by private
316 Free Entry
So far we have been assuming constant (and equal) populations of employers and workers. In
this section we generalize the formulation by allowing for free entry of employers. Let mj be
the number of employers in state j;w es t i l lu s eni to denote number of workers in state i.S i n c e
t h e r ei so n e - t o - o n em a t c h i n gw eh a v emi = ni for all i ≥ 1 but n0 (the number of unemployed
workers) may be larger or smaller than m0 (the number of vacant employers). We assume that
a worker contacts an employer in state j at rate αmj, while an employer contacts a random
worker in state i at rate αni.14
The measure of workers in each state evolves according to:



















ji − δni (20)
















The ﬁr s tt e r mo nt h er i g h th a n ds i d eo f( 2 0 )i st h eﬂow of new matches of productivity yi
created by all types of workers and employers. The second term is the total ﬂow of matches
with productivity yi destroyed endogenously when the worker “quits” to form a new match
with another employer. The third term represents those matches with productivity yi that are
destroyed when the employer “ﬁres” the worker in order to form a new match with another
worker. The last term is the ﬂow of matches dissolved exogenously. On the right hand side
contracts between the parties goes back to Lazear (1990). Lazear also notes that severance pay eﬀects are neutral
only when the payment made by the employer is received by the worker, and not if third-party intermediaries
receive or make any of the payments.
14This formulation implies that the total number of meetings is given by a quadratic matching technology
ξ (Ne,N w)=αNeNw,w h e r eNe is the total numbers of employers and Nw the total number of workers. In our
formulation, Nw =1and Ne =1− n0 + m0. We have also considered and will be reporting results for the
case in which the aggregate meeting technology is instead given by a function ξ (Ne,N w) which is monotonic in
both arguments and homogeneous of degree one. In this alternative formulation an employer contacts a random
worker at rate α(Ne)=ξ (1,1/Ne) and worker contacts a random employer at rate Neα(Ne).B u t n o t e t h a t
even if we adopt a matching technology that is linearly homogeneous in the aggregate populations, the matching





32of (21), the ﬁrst term is the ﬂow of workers who are displaced when their employers decide to
break up their current match to form a new match with another worker. The workers whose
matches are destroyed exogenously are accounted for by the second term. The last term is the
ﬂow of new matches created by unemployed workers and unmatched employers.
Before turning to the competitive matching equilibrium we pose the planner’s problem. The
planner chooses τk






2yini − C (m0)
#
dt
subject to the ﬂow constraints (20) and (21) and initial conditions for n0 and ni and mi for
i =1 ,...,N. Note that while unmatched employers incur a cost C (m0),w i t hC0 > 0 and
C00 ≥ 0.15 Letting λi be the shadow price associated with the ﬂow equation of the ith state, the




2yini − C (m0) − δ
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ij (λk + λ0 − λi − λj).






=1 if λk + λ0 >λ i + λj
∈ [0,1] if λk + λ0 = λi + λj
=0 if λk + λ0 <λ i + λj
(22)
and






i0 (λk − λi) (23)
with “=”i fm0 > 0. Condition (22) is familiar from the previous analysis. The left hand side of
condition (23) is the marginal cost of an unmatched employer (or the marginal cost of “opening
a vacancy”), and the right hand side is the expected return from having an additional vacancy
(note that λk − λi is the capital gain to the planner from creating a new match of quality yk
15In Pissarides (2000), C (m0) is the “cost of posting vacancies m0”.
33by matching a vacancy to a worker previously in a match of quality yi,w h i l eαniπkτk
i0 is the
probability that this capital gain is realized). Focusing on a solution with a positive measure







i0 (λk − λi). (24)
For i ≥ 1 the Euler equations are:




















0i (λk − λi).
The right hand side of this condition is readily interpreted as the ﬂow return to the planner from
allocating an additional worker to a match of quality yi. A (worker in a) match of type i yields
output 2yi and a capital loss λi − λ0 in the event of an exogenous break-up. The remaining
terms represent the expected capital gains from matching that are generated by an additional
match of type i. Take the third term, for example. With probability αnjπkτk
ij the worker in
the type i match meets an employer in a match of type j ≥ 1, they form a new match of quality
k and generate a capital gain equal to λk + λ0 − λi − λj. But in addition, with probability
αnjπkτk
ji the employer in match i meets a worker in a match of type j ≥ 1, they form a new
match of quality k and generate the same capital gain. Note that a worker in a match of quality
i generates (expected) capital gains both directly, by climbing up the productivity ladder, as
well as indirectly when the employer in the match of quality i climbs up the productivity ladder





























ij (λk + λ0 − λi − λj).
In all these expression α should be interpreted as α(Ne), an employer’s contact rate. The last term represents
“congestion externalities”.
34with other workers. Naturally, the planner internalizes both these returns. (As we saw in
the model with ﬁxed populations, only the direct return enters the agent’s calculations in the
decentralized economy.) The fourth term represents the expected capital gain that accrues to
the planner when the worker in a match of type i meets an unmatched employer. Similarly, the
ﬁfth term is the expected capital gain to the planner from having the employer in a match of
type i meet an unemployed worker. Similarly, for i =0we have:










0j (λk − λj).
The right hand side can again be interpreted as the marginal return of an unemployed worker.
The ﬁrst term is the expected capital gain the unemployed worker generates in the event she
matches with an unmatched employer. The second term is the expected capital gain in the
event she matches with a matched employer.17 Using (24), which holds as long as m0 > 0,a n d
collecting terms we arrive at:18

















From (22) we see that τk
ij = τk
ji except possibly for the case of randomized strategies. Using this
symmetry (mi = ni for i ≥ 1), we can write the Euler equations together with the optimality
17For the constant-returns matching case the Euler equation associated with ni is as in the text, while the one
associated with n0 is
































ij (λk + λ0 − λi − λj).
18This expression remains unchanged in the formulation with constant returns to scale.
35conditions (22) more compactly as

















ij (λk + λ0 − λi − λj) (25)

















0j (λk − λj). (26)
Conditions (25) and (26) are very similar to the ﬁrst order conditions for the model with a ﬁxed
number of employers. In particular, note that (25) and (26) reduce to (4) and (5) respectively
if we set C0 =0and m0 = n0. But more generally, in this formulation we have an additional
unknown, m0, and (24) provides the additional optimality condition.
Next, we characterize the competitive matching equilibrium using the bargaining procedure
we introduced in Section 3. Figures 1, 2 and 3 still describe the basic types of meetings.
(i). An unmatched employer meets an unemployed worker.
We begin with the situation illustrated in Figure 1, that is a bargaining situation in which
neither the employer nor the worker have outside opportunities. Agent A is an unemployed
worker, B an unmatched employer and Mk represents the value of a match of type k in the
competitive matching equilibrium. We use V0 and J0 to denote the values of an unemployed
worker and an unmatched employer respectively. As usual, the bargaining sequence is composed
of:
Subgame 1. With probability one half, the worker makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer Xk
AB = J0
which is accepted by the employer.
Subgame 2. With probability one half, the employer makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer Xk
BA = V0
which is accepted by the worker.
The expected payoﬀst ot h ew o r k e rA and the employer B are ΠA = V0 + 1
2 (Mk − M0) and
36Figure 6: An unmatched employer meets an unemployed worker.
ΠB = J0 + 1
2 (Mk − M0) respectively, where M0 = V0 + J0.S ow h e nA and B ﬁr s tm e e ta n d
form a match, their expected capital gains are




We think of a matched pair with no outside production opportunities as being involved in
continuous negotiations of the type illustrated by Figure 1. Output is continuously divided
among the partners in such as way so that the worker’s continuation payoﬀ is




and the employer’s is




(ii). An matched employer meets an unemployed worker.
Employer B, who is currently hiring worker A in a match with productivity yi, meets an
unemployed worker C and they draw a production opportunity yk. This situation is illustrated
in Figure 7.
Subgame 1. With probability a half, B makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer specifying continuation
payoﬀs as well as a proposal to engage in joint production to either A or C.I fB was to oﬀer
(continued) joint production to A,h ew o u l do ﬀer A her minimum acceptable payoﬀ, Xk
BA = V0.
37Figure 7: A matched employer meets an unemployed worker.
Worker A would accept the oﬀer and B’s payoﬀ from continuing the match with A would be
Mi − V0. Alternatively, if B oﬀers joint production to worker C,t h e nh ew o u l da l s oo ﬀer C
her minimum acceptable continuation payoﬀ Xk
BC = V0; C would accept and B’s continuation
payoﬀ from forming a new match with C would be Mk −V0.T h u sB will ﬁre A to form a new
type k match with C i fa n do n l yi fMk >M i. In this case the payoﬀst oA, B and C are V0,
Mk − V0 and V0 respectively. Conversely, if Mk <M i,t h e nB oﬀers continued production to
A, she accepts and the payoﬀst oA, B and C are V0, Mi − V0 and V0.
Subgame 2. With probability another half, A and C simultaneously make oﬀers to B.W o r k e r
A oﬀers B’s payoﬀ to be Xi
AB =m i n ( Mi − V0,M k − V0 + ε) and worker C oﬀers B’s payoﬀ
to be Xk
CB =m i n( Mk − V0,M i − V0 + ε),w h e r eε is an arbitrarily small positive number. If
Mk >M i then B accepts C’s oﬀer to form a new match, and the payoﬀst oA, B and C are
V0, Mi − V0,a n dMk − Mi + V0. Conversely, if Mk <M i then B accepts A’s oﬀer to continue
their match and the payoﬀst oA, B and C are Mi − Mk + V0, Mk − V0 and V0 respectively.
In both subgames B ﬁres A to form a new match with C i fa n do n l yi fMk >M i.T h e
































 if Mk <M i. (28)
(iii). An unmatched employer meets an employed worker.
Worker B who is employed with A meets C, an unmatched employer. The analysis of this
case amounts to a relabelling of the previous one so we just note that the expected capital gains
ΓA, ΓB and ΓC are given by (27) and (28).
(iv). A matched employer meets an employed worker.
Suppose that worker B and employer C meet and have the option to form a new match of
type k. The circumstances are now that B is currently in a match of type i with employer A,
and C is in a match of type j with worker D. This situation is illustrated in Figure 8.
Figure 8: An employed worker meets a matched employer.
Subgame 1. With probability a half, the two employers A and C simultaneously make oﬀers
to B.E m p l o y e rC also makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to her current worker D,a n dt h i so ﬀer
39is contingent on her oﬀer to worker B being rejected. By the usual arguments, A oﬀers B’s
continuation payoﬀ to be Xi
AB =m a x {min[Mi − J0,M k − (Mj − V0)+ε],V 0}. Similarly, C
oﬀers B’s continuation payoﬀ to be Xk
BC =m i n[ Mk − (Mj − V0),M i − J0 + ε].
Subgame 2. With probability a half, the two workers B and D simultaneously make oﬀers to
employer C.W o r k e rB also makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to her employer A. The analysis
follows closely that of subgame 1.
In both subgames B and C leave their current partners to form a new match of type k
i fa n do n l yi fMi + Mj − M0 <M k. Suppose, without loss of generality, that Mi <M j.I f
Mj <M k <M i + Mj − M0,t h e nB and C stay in their current matches and extract strictly
positive expected side-payments from their respective partners. If Mi <M k <M j, then the
existing matches are preserved but only C is able to extract a strictly positive expected side-
payment from her partner. This meeting does not generate enough bargaining power for B to
be able to extract resources from A. Finally, if Mk <M i,t h e nB and C stay in their current



























































































,i fMk <M i.
Given the equilibrium outcomes of the bargaining procedure, in the equilibrium the ex-




































Here each employer who posts a vacancy pays c = C0 (m0),w h i l eﬁlled employers do not have to
pay anything (say because production itself is free advertisement to attract workers).19 As usual,
φk
ij denotes the probability with which a match of type i a n dam a t c ho ft y p ej are destroyed
to form a new match of type k in the equilibrium outcome of the bargaining procedure. For
i =1 ,...,N and letting wi denote the worker’s wage while employed in a match of type i,t h e
value of a worker in a match of type i is














































































19If C (m0) is strictly convex, proﬁt cm0 − C (m0) is distributed to the owners of the scarce factor in the
vacancy-posting technology. This proﬁtw i l ln o ta ﬀect the labor market because the utility function is linear.
41Similarly, the value of an employer in a match of productivity yi is:
















































































ji, adding (32) to (31) and (30) to (29) respectively imply













ij (Mk + M0 − Mi − Mj). (33)













0j (Mk − Mj). (34)
Since there is free entry of employers, any equilibrium with a positive measure of unmatched
employers must be such that the expected return to an unmatched employer is just enough to









i0 (Mk − Mi). (35)
If we compare (33), (34) and (35) with (25), (26) and (24) we see that —just as in the case with
equal and ﬁxed populations of employers and workers— the planner’s ﬁrst-order conditions and
the equilibrium conditions diﬀer only in that in his calculations the planner imputes an “eﬀec-
tive” contact rate equal to 2α while α is the contact rate to an individual agent. Alternatively,
42if we replace the subjective interest rate of the social planner r,w i t hr0 =2 r+δ, then again, the
ﬁrst order conditions corresponding to the modiﬁed planner’s problem correspond to one of the
competitive matching equilibria. If the equilibrium is unique, then the equilibrium allocation
is identical to that of the modiﬁed social planner’s economy.
7 Discussion
In this section we discuss how our paper relates to the existing theoretical literature on labor
market matching models with on-on-the-job search. Burdett (1978) adds on-the-job search to
the single-agent search decision problem faced by a worker who samples wages from an exoge-
nous distribution. Mortensen (1978) studies the relationship between the nature of the wage
bargaining problem between a worker and an employer and their choices of (on-the-job) search
intensities. He observed that the search intensities the employer and worker choose in a Nash
equilibrium of the noncooperative game are too high relative to the ones that would be chosen
jointly to maximize the value of the match. He then explored the ability of two alternative
mechanisms to improve eﬃciency when agents choose their search strategies noncooperatively.
The mechanisms do not require direct monitoring, but rely on both agent’s ability to commit
to future actions. The ﬁrst is an ex ante agreement by each party to make a counteroﬀer when
the other receives an attractive alternative matching opportunity. The second is an ex ante
agreement to fully compensate the other partner as a precondition for separation. Relative to
the joint wealth maximizing strategy, both parties search too much in the noncooperative Nash
equilibrium under the mechanism with commitment to counteroﬀer. But under the commit-
ment to fully compensate the partner in case separation, the Nash noncooperative equilibrium
delivers the pair of search strategies that maximize the joint surplus.
Diamond and Maskin (1979) extends Mortensen (1978) by embedding the search problem
of the single partnership in an equilibrium model with many potential partnerships. They
study the steady-state equilibria of a model where agents are randomly paired in a costly
search process to carry out a single productive project. As in our setup, agents are ex ante
43homogeneous but matches are heterogeneous ex post and utility is transferable. A diﬀerence
is that once matched, their agents decide whether or not to continue searching and only after
partners have stopped searching the project is completed and both agents then exit the market.
The interesting situations arise when a matched agent ﬁnds the option to break the current
match to form a new one. In their language, a single breach (of contract) occurs when a matched
agent forms a new match with an unmatched agent, while a double breach takes place when two
matched agents leave their partners to form a new match. The two key diﬀerences from our
work, are that in that model (i) agents always split the match surplus symmetrically, and (ii)
in anticipation of possible breaches, contracts may provide for compensation or “damages” to
be paid to the breached-against partner, which requires that agents have the ability to commit
to future actions or else “courts” that exogenously enforce contracts. Diamond and Maskin
show that if the partner who breaks the match is required to fully compensate the breached-
against partner for the loss she suﬀers, then as in our competitive matching equilibrium, the
two individuals with the option to form a new match ﬁnd it in their interest to breach precisely
when by doing so they increase the sum of the expected payoﬀs of the four parties involved
in the meeting. The diﬀerence is that our competitive matching equilibrium achieves this
outcome through a more ﬂexible bargaining process involving sidepayments, without requiring
that agents be able to commit to compensate their partners in case of future breaches.
In Diamond and Maskin (1979) agents match to produce one time. In some unpublished
notes, Diamond and Maskin (1981) extend that framework to allow for continuous production.
Their physical environment corresponds to the special case of our economy with N =2 .I nt h i s
version they continue to assume that partners split the matching surplus symmetrically and
that when a partner separates she must pay the breach-against partner compensatory damages,
and explore some properties of a steady-state equilibrium in which single breaches occur but
double breaches do not.20












10 =1 ,a n d
specialize the analysis to an equilibrium with τ
2
11 =0 , then (1)-(2) would reduce to the ﬂow equations in page 4
of Diamond and Maskin (1981).
44The model in Burdett, Imai and Wright (2004) also has ex ante homogeneous agents, ex post
heterogeneous matches, costly search, and agents who while matched decide whether to search
or not. They consider two setups. In the ﬁrst setup, they assume that once two agents make
contact, they cannot observe the realization of their prospective match productivity unless they
drop their current partners (if they have any).21 Utility may interpreted to be transferable or
not in this setup. For this version of the model they provide a full characterization of the
equilibrium set and its welfare properties. The second setup allows agents to keep the option
to stay with their current partners after observing the realization of the match quality with
a prospective partner. They lay out the model with two types of matches and argue that
their main results (e.g. multiplicity and eﬃciency properties of equilibria) are robust to this
generalization. This second setup relies on the assumption that utility is nontransferable.22
This must be so because if utility was transferable, then matched agents would attempt to
counter their partners’ outside oﬀers just as they do in our model. So, although the physical
environment of Burdett, Imai and Wright (2004) is essentially the same as ours, their analysis is
quite diﬀerent because they make assumptions that rule out the multilateral breach situations
that are an essential part of our notion of equilibrium.
Burdett and Mortensen (1998) developed an inﬂuential on-the-job search model with ex
ante homogeneous populations of employers and workers.23 Employers are assumed to post
21This assumption makes their model extremely tractable by eliminating “composition eﬀects”: The gains
from forming a match of a given quality are the same regardless of the state of the other partner, so the value
functions are independent of the endogenous distribution of match qualities among actual relationships. The fact
that payoﬀs depend on the distribution of characteristics of potential partners is a feature that arises naturally
in our model and in many other matching models, both with ex post match heterogeneity and on-the-job search
(e.g. Diamond and Maskin (1979, 1981)) and with ex ante heterogeneity, even with no on-the-job search (e.g.
Burdett and Coles (1997), Shimer and Smith (2000, 2001)).
22The on-the-job search model of Cornelius (2003) also assumes utility is nontransferable, but diﬀers from
Burdett, Imai and Wright (2004) in that agents are ex ante heterogeneous, search is costless both on and oﬀ the
job, the meeting technology is quadratic.
23The model Burdett-Mortensen model was originally developed to explain wage dispersion among homoge-
n e o u sw o r k e r sa n dr e l a t ei tt oe m p l o y e rs i z e ,b u th a sb yn o wb e e ne x t e n d e di nm a n yw a y sa n da p p l i e dt os t u d y
a wide range of issues, both empirically and theoretically. Van den Berg and Ridder (1998), Bontemps, Robin
and Van den Berg (1999, 2000) are examples of papers that have structurally estimated the model. Theoreti-
cal extensions and applications include Burdett and Coles (2003), and Burdett, Lagos and Wright (2004). See
Manning (2003) and Mortensen (2003) for other applications and more references.
45and commit to wages, have access to a constant returns to scale production technology, and
may employ any number of workers at the posted wage. Whenever an employed worker meets an
employer with a posted wage higher than her current wage, she quits to join the new employer’s
workforce. Therefore, employers who post low wages experience high quit rates and have smaller
workforces in the steady state. By requiring that steady-state proﬁtb ee q u a t e da c r o s sﬁrms,
Burdett and Mortensen derive a nondegenerate equilibrium wage distribution. Note that there
is an extreme notion of commitment at work in this model: once the employer has chosen a
wage to oﬀer its employees, the assumption is that it cannot be changed. It cannot be raised
to counter a worker’s outside oﬀer, and it cannot be cut down once the outside oﬀer is gone.
Postel-Vinay and Robin (2000) work out an extension of Burdett and Mortensen (1998)
with ex ante heterogeneous employers and workers. Employers still have the power to make
take-it-or-leave-it oﬀers to workers but are in addition allowed to counter the oﬀers that their
workers receive from competing employers. When a worker of productivity ε who is matched
to a ﬁrm with productivity p contacts a potential employer with productivity p0, the employers
enter a Bertrand competition for the worker that is ultimately won by the most productive
ﬁrm. If p>p 0, then the worker stays with the current employer who from then on is assumed
to be committed to paying her no less than the wage that won the Bertrand competition. If
p<p 0, then the worker quits to the higher productivity employer who is also assumed to pay
no less that the winning wage for the duration of the match.24 Relative to Burdett-Mortensen,
the extension of Postel-Vinay and Robin (2000) assumes a weaker form of commitment: Firms
still commit not to reduce wages in the future, but can counter outside oﬀers. In a diﬀerent
way, the extension of Coles (2001) also assumes a weaker form of commitment, this time by
24Instead of giving the ﬁrm the power to make a worker take-it-or-leave-it oﬀers, in Dey and Flinn (2000)
employers and workers in continuing relationships split the match surplus according to the Nash cooperative
solution. If an employed worker is contacted by another employer, then the current and prospective employers
enter a Bertrand competition for the worker. Again, the employer with higher productivity can always oﬀer the
worker higher continuation utility and hence “wins” the worker. From then on, once the worker’s outside oﬀer
is gone, the assumption is that the match continues to split the surplus according to the Nash solution where
the threat point is taken to be the maximal continuation value oﬀered to the worker by the ﬁrm that lost the
last Bertrand competition to hire him. (Workers who are hired from the unemployment pool bargain with their
value of search as threat point until they get a better outside oﬀer while searching on the job.)
46assuming ﬁrms cannot respond to outside oﬀers but can change wages during times when their
workforce has no outside oﬀers outstanding. From this perspective, our paper takes the analysis
a step further by modelling agents who cannot commit to any future actions.
Another relevant diﬀerence is that in the Burdett-Mortensen approach each employer oper-
ates a constant returns to scale production technology that can in principle employ the whole
population of workers. So if there are heterogeneous employers, it would be desirable and
technologically feasible to have all workers matched to the highest-productivity employer. In
contrast, we study the consequences of the opposite polar assumption to constant returns by
assuming that each employer can hire at most one worker. This extreme version of decreasing
returns enriches the sets of transitions that employers and workers may engage in, with no loss
of tractability. For example, the model delivers endogenous “ﬁring” in addition to endogenous
“quits”. Also, the limited-capacity assumption, is what allows the model to exhibit instances of
replacement hiring as well as situations in which —in the language of the empirical labor ﬂows
literature— job reallocation induces worker reallocation and vice versa.
In Pissarides (1994) or Pissarides (2000) employed workers can search on the job but em-
ployers do not (so all quits involve workers taking jobs that were previously vacant), and the
wage is assumed to be determined according to a linear surplus splitting rule at all times. Rel-
a t i v et ow h a tw ed oh e r e ,ak e yd i ﬀerence is that both in Pissarides (1994, 2000) and in Shimer
(2004) matched employers are not allowed to oﬀer side payments to counter their worker’s out-
side oﬀers, and similarly, a vacant employer who contacts an employed worker cannot make side
payments to persuade the worker to quit. Competition involving side-payments among all the
parties involved in a typical on-the-job search meeting is an essential feature of the equilibrium
in the model we develop here. Also, we propose a competitive bargaining procedure to split the
gains from trade instead of relying on surplus splitting rules or the Nash axiomatic approach.25
25Shimer (2004) points out that in the context of the on-the-job search model of Pissarides (1994, 2000), a
simple linear surplus splitting rule is in general not equivalent to the Nash bargaining solution and that adopting
the former may lead to pair-wise ineﬃcient outcomes. In addition, Shimer (2004) argues that when the linear
splitting rule is replaced by the Nash bargaining solution the model is capable of generating equilibria with wage
dispersion even in the case of ex ante identical employers and workers.
478 Concluding Remarks
We developed an on-the-job model of search that has many of the stylized properties of actual
labor markets. Worker ﬂows exceed job ﬂows, displaced agents suﬀer persistent reductions in
permanent incomes, job-to-job transitions are common and ﬁrms often engage in simultaneous
hiring and ﬁring. We proposed and analyzed a notion of competitive equilibrium based on a
particular bargaining procedure and explored its eﬃciency properties.
There are several extensions that seem worthwhile pursuing. First, motivated by the obser-
vations in Bertola and Rogerson (1997) and Blanchard and Portugal (2001), the model could be
used to analyze the eﬀects that employment protection policies have on the amount of worker
reallocation in excess of job reallocation. Bertola and Rogerson ﬁnd that despite higher em-
ployment protection in Europe relative to the US, European job turnover rates are not that
diﬀerent from those in the US; yet there is evidence that worker turnover (and in particu-
lar the rate at which workers enter and leave unemployment) is lower in Europe. Blanchard
and Portugal, report that relative to the US, worker ﬂows are much smaller in Portugal, even
for given job ﬂows. In particular, the ﬂow of workers out of employment in Portugal barely
exceeds job destruction and they attribute this to the Portuguese employment protection poli-
cies. Our model suggests a simple explanation for these observations: Employment protection
censors precisely the transitions that cause worker turnover in excess of job turnover, namely
separations resulting from double breaches and from employer-initiated single breaches.
Ar e l a t e di s s u ei st h a ta na p p r o p r i a t ea s s e s s m e n to ft h ew e l f a r ee ﬀects of employment
protection policies calls for a model with on-the-job search, perhaps along the lines we proposed
above. Calculating the welfare eﬀects of employment protection policies with a model that does
not allow for job-to-job transitions is likely to lead to smaller welfare losses from the policy.
For example, Blanchard and Portugal assume that all separations (either employer or worker-
initiated) result in the worker being unemployed and the ﬁrm vacant. But suppose —as is the
case in our model— that separations do not necessarily result in both partners being unmatched.
48Then policies that rule out separations in this type of environment will seem to have higher
overall costs than in an environment where quits necessarily entail an unemployment spell.
At a deeper level, we would also like to understand the reasons why employment protection
policies exist. In our framework with one-employer to one-worker matching with transferable
utility, workers and employers are essentially symmetric (even if allowing for free entry of em-
ployers introduces a slight asymmetry), and there are no eﬃciency gains from employment
protection policies. In order to explore the rationale behind the existence of employment pro-
tection policies, perhaps, we have to introduce some asymmetry, such as that each worker works
for one employer while each employer hires several workers. This extension would also be use-
ful to address many empirical issues such as the size distribution of ﬁrms or the relationship
between ﬁrm size and job and worker ﬂows.
49AA p p e n d i x
P r o o fo fL e m m a1 . Let f (n0) ≡
2δ(1−n0)−α(1+π)n2
0
δ+2απn0 . Combining the ˙ n2 =0and ˙ n0 =0
conditions we see that n1 = f (n0).I tc a nb es h o w nt h a tf0 < 0 on [0,1],s ot oe a c hn0 ∈ [0,1]

















2δ (1 − n0) − α(1 + π)n2
0
¤2 .
Substituting n1 = f (n0) back into the ˙ n0 =0delivers a single equation in n0 which can be
written as G(n0;φ)=0 . Direct calculations reveal that G(n0;φ)=αn2
0 − δ (1 − n0) > 0 for
all φ ∈ [0,1].A l s o ,G(n0;φ)=αn2
0 − δ (1 − n0) − αφπ. Note that an increase in φ causes G to
shift down uniformly. Therefore, to ensure that G(n0;φ) < 0 for all φ it suﬃces to guarantee
















> 0,w h i c h
together with the fact that f0 < 0 implies that the steady state is unique.
Bargaining outcomes and the core.
Before proving part (c) of Proposition 1 we introduce some notation. Let I denote the set of
agents who are directly or indirectly (i.e. through a partner) involved in a meeting. For example,
I = {A,B,C,D} in the situation illustrated in Figure 3. Within the context of a meeting, an
allocation is a collection of partnerships. For example, there are two possible allocations for
the meeting in Figure 3: h(A,B),(C,D)i and h(B,C),(A,D)i.T h eﬁrst represents the case in
which A remains matched to B while C remains matched to D. The second corresponds to the
case in which B and C form a new match while A and D become unmatched (or become matched
50to each other but in state 0).26 Let Aj denote the set of all possible allocations in a meeting that
concerns j agents. Then, A2 = {h(A,B)i,h(A),(B)i}, A3 = {h(A,B),(C)i,h(A),(B,C)i} and
A4 = {h(A,B),(C,D)i,h(B,C),(A,D)i}.A na l l o c a t i o na ∈ Aj together with a payoﬀ proﬁle
Π ∈ Rj constitute an outcome [a,Π]. For example, [h(A),(B)i,(ΠA,ΠB)] with ΠA = ΠB = V0
is the outcome corresponding to a situation in which two unmatched agents meet and no match
is formed. For any given meeting, a nonempty subset S ⊆ I is called a coalition.L e tv denote
a function that assigns a real number to each coalition S.T h en u m b e rv(S) is called the worth
of coalition S. Since utility is fully transferable, v(S) summarizes the utility possibility set
of coalition S. Intuitively, v(S) is the total utility available to the coalition, which can then
be distributed among the coalition members in any way. An outcome [a,Π] is blocked by a
coalition S if there exists a payoﬀ proﬁle ˜ Π with
P
i∈S ˜ Πi ≤ v(S) such that ˜ Πi > Πi for all
i ∈ S. With transferable utility, an outcome [a,Π] is blocked by S iﬀ
P
i∈S Πi <v(S).A n
outcome [a,Π] that is feasible for the grand coalition (i.e. such that
P
i∈I Πi ≤ v(I))i si nt h e
core if there is no coalition S that blocks this outcome. With transferable utility, an outcome
[a,Π] is in the core iﬀ
P
i∈S Πi ≥ v(S) for all S ⊆ I and
P
i∈I Πi ≤ v(I).
P r o o fo fp a r t(c) of Proposition 1. The proof proceeds in three steps.
(Step 1). First consider the case illustrated in Figure 1, where an unemployed worker A
and an unmatched employer B meet and have the opportunity to form a match of productivity
yk > 0. For this case we have I = {A,B}, and the list of all possible coalitions is {A,B},
{A}, {B}. The worth of the grand coalition is v(I)=m a x( 2 V0,2Vk)=2 Vk,w h i l ev({A})=
v({B})=V0. A vector of of payoﬀs (ΠA,ΠB) lies in the core if and only if (i) ΠA +ΠB =2 Vk;
and (ii) Πj ≥ V0 for j = A,B. Figure 9 shows the core: it is the segment on the ΠA+ΠB =2 Vk
line that lies between the equilibrium payoﬀs of subgames 1 and 2 of the bilateral bargaining
procedure. Both equilibrium payoﬀs as well as the expected payoﬀ lie in the core.
(Step 2). Next consider the case illustrated in Figure 2: agent B who is currently in a
26We ignore other feasible allocations such as h(A,C),(B,D)i, which would correspond to ”break up both
matches without forming a new one” because they will play no role in the analysis that follows.
51match of productivity yi with agent A, meets unmatched agent C and they draw a productive
opportunity yk.H e r eI = {A,B,C} and the list of all possible coalitions is {A,B,C}, {A,B},
{A,C}, {B,C}, {A}, {B}, {C}. The corresponding values are v(I)=m a x( 2 Vi + V0,2Vk + V0),
v({A,B})=2 Vi, v({A,C})=2 V0, v({B,C})=2 Vk, v({A})=v({B})=v({C})=V0.
Hence a payoﬀ proﬁle Π =( ΠA,ΠB,ΠC) belongs to the core if and only if: (i) ΠA+ΠB +ΠC =
max(2Vi + V0,2Vk + V0); (ii) ΠA + ΠB ≥ 2Vi; (iii) ΠB + ΠC ≥ 2Vk;a n d(iv) Πj ≥ V0 for
j = A,B,C.I fVk >V i the four conditions can be rewritten as: (1) ΠA = V0; (2) ΠB ≥ 2Vi−V0;
(3) ΠB + ΠC =2 Vk;a n d(4) ΠC ≥ V0.T h e ﬁrst panel of Figure 10 illustrates the core for
this case; it consists of all the payoﬀs (V0,ΠB,ΠC) such that (ΠB,ΠC) l i eo nt h es e g m e n to f
the ΠB + ΠC =2 Vk line between the equilibrium payoﬀs of subgames 1 and 2 of the bilateral
bargaining procedure. From the ﬁgure it is clear that the equilibrium payoﬀs of both subgames
and the expected payoﬀ all belong to the core. Conversely, if Vk <V i, then the four conditions
reduce to: (1’) ΠA ≥ V0; (2’) ΠB ≥ 2Vk − V0; (3’) ΠA + ΠB =2 Vi;a n d(4’) ΠC = V0.
The second panel of Figure 10 illustrates the core for this case; it consists of all the payoﬀs
(ΠA,ΠB,V 0) such that (ΠA,ΠB) lie on the segment of the ΠA + ΠB =2 Vi line between the
equilibrium payoﬀs of subgames 1 and 2 of the bilateral bargaining procedure. From the ﬁgure
it is again clear that the equilibrium payoﬀs of both subgames and the expected payoﬀ all
belong to the core.
(Step 3). Finally, consider the case illustrated in Figure 3: while A and B are in a match
of productivity yi and C and D a r ei nam a t c ho fp r o d u c t i v i t yyj, agents B and C meet
and draw a productive opportunity yk.H e r e I = {A,B,C,D} and the list of all possi-
ble coalitions is: {A,B,C,D}, {A,B,C}, {A,B,D}, {B,C,D}, {A,C,D}, {A,B}, {C,D},
{A,C}, {B,D}, {B,C}, {A,D}, {A}, {B}, {C}, {D}. The corresponding values are v(I)=
max(2Vk +2 V0,2Vi +2 Vj), v({A,B,C})=m a x ( 2 Vi + V0,2Vk + V0), v({A,B,D})=2 Vi +
V0, v({B,C,D})=m a x ( 2 Vj + V0,2Vk + V0), v({A,C,D})=2 Vj + V0, v({A,B})=2 Vi,
v({C,D})=2 Vj, v({A,C})=v{{B,D}} = v{{A,D}} =2 V0, v({A})=v({B})=
v({C})=v({D})=V0.A p a y o ﬀ proﬁle Π =( ΠA,ΠB,ΠC,ΠD) is in the core if and only
52if it satisﬁes the following inequalities: ΠA + ΠB + ΠC + ΠD =m a x ( 2 Vk +2 V0,2Vi +2 Vj),
ΠA + ΠB + ΠC ≥ max(2Vi + V0,2Vk + V0), ΠB + ΠC + ΠD ≥ max(2Vj + V0,2Vk + V0), ΠA +
ΠB+ΠD ≥ 2Vi+V0, ΠA+ΠC+ΠD ≥ 2Vj+V0, ΠA+ΠB ≥ 2Vi, ΠC+ΠD ≥ 2Vj, ΠB+ΠC ≥ 2Vk,
ΠA+ΠC ≥ 2V0, ΠB +ΠD ≥ 2V0, ΠA+ΠD ≥ 2V0, Πj ≥ V0 for j = A,B,C,D. It is straightfor-
ward to verify that the equilibrium and expected payoﬀs of the bilateral bargaining procedure
satisfy these ﬁfteen inequalities.
We now provide a graphical analysis of the bargaining outcome in a meeting involving four
agents. Assume, with no loss of generality, that Vj >V i. We begin analyzing the case in which
Vj + Vi − V0 <V k. For this case it can be shown that any payoﬀ proﬁl ei nt h ec o r em u s th a v e
ΠA = ΠD = V0, ΠB ≥ 2Vi−V0, ΠC ≥ 2Vj −V0,a n dΠB +ΠC =2 Vk. A simple two-dimensional
ﬁgure can still be used to fully characterize the core. This is done in Figure 11.
Next consider the case Vj <V k <V j + Vi − V0. It is possible to show that any payoﬀ
proﬁle Π =( ΠA,ΠB,ΠC,ΠD) in the core must satisfy: V0 ≤ ΠA ≤ 2(Vi + Vj − Vk) − V0, V0 +
2(Vk − Vj) ≤ ΠB ≤ 2Vi−V0, V0+2(Vk − Vi) ≤ ΠC ≤ 2Vj−V0, V0 ≤ ΠD ≤ 2(Vi + Vj − Vk)−V0.
Since illustrating the core payoﬀs now requires a three-dimensional diagram, we instead provide
a simpler two-dimensional graphical representation of the equilibrium payoﬀs induced by the
bilateral bargaining procedure. Figure 12 displays the payoﬀst h a tA and C get against those
of B and D. In Subgame 1, A and C g e tt h el a r g e s tj o i n tp a y o ﬀ while B and D get the smallest
joint payoﬀ within the core. The opposite happens in Subgame 2. The expected payoﬀ lies
halfway on the segment between the joint payoﬀs corresponding to each subgame. Allocations
that yield joint payoﬀs outside this segment are not in the core.
The individual payoﬀst oA and C are shown in the ﬁrst panel of Figure 13. Payoﬀs outside
the heavy square lie outside the core. In Subgame 1 the payoﬀst oA and C are given by
the upper-right corner of the square. Conversely, their payoﬀs in Subgame 2 are given by the
lower-left corner of the box. The expected payoﬀst oA and B lie at the center of the square.
Similarly, the second panel of Figure 13 shows the payoﬀst oB and D. And again, every payoﬀ
53proﬁle Π i nt h ec o r em u s th a v e(ΠD,ΠB) inside the heavy square. The upper-right corner of this
box represents D and B’s payoﬀs in Subgame 2, when they get to make the take-it-or-leave-it
oﬀers. Their payoﬀs in Subgame 1, when A and C get to make take-it-or-leave-it oﬀers, are on
the lower-left corner of the box. Their expected payoﬀs lie in the middle of the square.
Next consider the case Vi <V k <V j <V i + Vj − V0. For this case it can be shown
that any payoﬀ proﬁle Π =( ΠA,ΠB,ΠC,ΠD) i nt h ec o r em u s ts a t i s f y :V0 ≤ ΠA ≤ 2Vi − V0,
V0 ≤ ΠB ≤ 2Vi − V0, V0 +2( Vk − Vi) ≤ ΠC ≤ 2Vj − V0, V0 ≤ ΠD ≤ 2(Vi + Vj − Vk) − V0.
Figure 14 displays the payoﬀst h a tA and C get against those of B and D. In Subgame 1 A and
C get the biggest joint payoﬀ while B and D get the smallest joint payoﬀ of any core allocation.
The opposite happens in Subgame 2. The expected payoﬀ lies halfway on the segment between
the joint payoﬀs corresponding to each subgame. Allocations that yield joint payoﬀs outside
this segment are not in the core. The individual payoﬀst oA and C are shown in the ﬁrst panel
of Figure 15. Payoﬀs outside the heavy rectangle lie outside the core. In Subgame 1 the payoﬀs
to A and C are given by the upper-right corner of the rectangle. Their payoﬀs in Subgame 2
are given by the lower-left corner of the rectangle. The expected payoﬀst oA and B lie at the
center of the rectangle. The second panel of Figure 15 shows the payoﬀst oB and D.
Finally, consider the case Vk <V i <V j <V i + Vj − V0. For this case it can be shown
that any payoﬀ proﬁle Π =( ΠA,ΠB,ΠC,ΠD) i nt h ec o r em u s ts a t i s f yV0 ≤ ΠA ≤ 2Vi − V0,
V0 ≤ ΠB ≤ 2Vi − V0, V0 ≤ ΠC ≤ 2Vj − V0,a n dV0 ≤ ΠD ≤ 2Vj − V0. Figure 16 displays the
payoﬀst h a tA and C get against those of B and D. In Subgame 1 A and C get the biggest
joint payoﬀ while B and D get the smallest joint payoﬀ of any core allocation. The opposite
happens in Subgame 2. The expected joint payoﬀ lies halfway on the segment between the
joint payoﬀs corresponding to each subgame. Allocations that yield joint payoﬀs outside this
segment are not in the core. The individual payoﬀst oA and C are shown in the ﬁrst panel of
Figure 17. Payoﬀs outside the heavy rectangle lie outside the core. In Subgame 1 the payoﬀs
to A and C are given by the upper-right corner of the rectangle. Conversely, their payoﬀsi n
Subgame 2 are given by the lower-left corner of the rectangle. The expected payoﬀst oA and
54B lie at the center of the rectangle. Similarly, the second panel of Figure 17 shows the payoﬀs
to B and D.
The model with ﬁring taxes.
We now analyze the bargaining procedure in the presence of ﬁring taxes (Section 5.2). Start
with the single-breach situation of Figure 2. The bargaining procedure is:
Subgame 1. With probability a half, B makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer specifying con-
tinuation payoﬀs as well as a proposal to engage in joint production to either A or C.I f B
was to oﬀer continued joint production to A,h ew o u l do ﬀer A her minimum acceptable payoﬀ,
Xk
BA = V0 + Sk
i0.A g e n t A would accept the oﬀer and B’s payoﬀ from continued production
with A would then be 2Vi − V0 − Sk
i0.A l t e r n a t i v e l y , i f B was to oﬀer joint production to C
he would oﬀer her Xk
BC = V0, her minimum acceptable continuation value. C would accept
this oﬀer and B’s payoﬀ after paying the ﬁring compensation to A would be 2Vk − V0 − Tk
i0.







then B will choose to leave A and form a new match with C.T h e
payoﬀst oA, B and C will be V0 + Sk
i0, 2Vk − V0 − Tk
i0,a n dV0 respectively. Alternatively, if







,t h e nB will oﬀer continued production to A and the payoﬀst oA, B
and C will be V0 + Sk
i0, 2Vi − V0 − Sk
i0,a n dV0.
Subgame 2. With probability another half, A and C simultaneously make oﬀers to B.
Since A’s outside option is now V0 + Sk
i0, she is willing to oﬀer B no more than 2Vi − V0 − Sk
i0.
On the other hand, the maximum C is willing to oﬀer B is 2Vk − V0. Therefore A oﬀers B
a continuation payoﬀ Xi
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i0,2Vk − V0 − Tk
i0 + ε
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oﬀer is for B’s continuation payoﬀ to be Xk
CB =m i n
¡
2Vk − V0 − Tk











then B forms a new match










i0 appears subtracting from the second argument of the “min” in X
k
AB and from the
ﬁrst argument of the “min” in X
k
CB because when C transfers 2Vk − V0 to B,i fB matches with C he only gets
2Vk − V0 − T
k
ij after paying the ﬁring tax. Since S
k
ij ≤ Vi − V0, agent A a l w a y sw a n t st op r e s e r v eh e rm a t c h
with B; the “max” in X
k
CB ensures that A oﬀers B a continuation payoﬀ at least equal to her outside option ,
V0 + S
k
i0,e v e ni fC’s oﬀer to B is 2Vk − V0 − T
k
i0 <V 0 + S
k
i0.







then B stays matched to A and the payoﬀs
to A, B and C are 2Vi −
¡
2Vk − V0 − Tk
i0
¢
, 2Vk − V0 − Tk
i0,a n dV0 respectively.







;o re q u i v a l e n t l y ,
if 2Vk−Tk
i0+V0+Sk
i0 > 2Vi+V0, i.e. if and only if the total surplus of A, B and C from forming
the new match after paying the net tax to the government (the left-hand side) exceeds the total
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,t h e nA and B preserve their match and the




































,t h e nB remains matched to A and is unable to extract a positive
expected side-payment from her: all agents’ continuation payoﬀs remain unchanged and nobody
experiences capital gains or losses.
Next, consider the double-breach situation illustrated in Figure 3.
Subgame 1. With probability a half, A and C simultaneously make oﬀers to B. C also
makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to his existing partner D,a n dt h i so ﬀer is contingent on his
oﬀer to B being rejected. C makes the smallest acceptable oﬀer to D,n a m e l yV0 + Sk
ji.T h e
resulting payoﬀ to C from continuing to match with D is 2Vj −V0 −Sk
ji, which constitutes the
opportunity cost for C to form a new match. Thus the maximum utility C is willing to give up
to attract B (i.e. the utility transfer to B that would make C just indiﬀerent between staying
with D and forming a new match with B)i s2Vk − Tk
ji − (2Vj − V0 − Sk
ji). This transfer would
guarantee B a continuation payoﬀ equal to 2Vk − (2Vj − V0 + Tk
ij + Tk
ji − Sk
ji) (net of his tax
liability Tk
ij for separating from A). If B “ﬁres” A,t h e nA’s continuation payoﬀ is V0+Sk
ij.T h u s
the maximum A is willing to oﬀer B is 2Vi−V0−Sk
ij. Since this valuation is nonnegative (recall
56that Sk
ij ≤ Vi − V0), A will want to make sure that B ﬁnds her oﬀer acceptable, and for this
she must ensure that B’s payoﬀ is at least as large as V0. Therefore, A oﬀers B a continuation
payoﬀ Xi
AB = Max{V0 + Sk
ij,Min[2Vi − V0 − Sk
ij,2Vk − 2Vj + V0 + Sk
ji − Tk
ji − Tk
ij + ε]} and
C oﬀers B’s payoﬀ to be Xk
CB = Min[2Vk − 2Vj + V0 + Sk
ji − Tk
ji − Tk
ij,2Vi − V0 − Sk
ij + ε] for
an arbitrarily small positive ε. Then, B will accept C’s oﬀer to form the new match for sure if










Subgame 2. With probability another half, B and D simultaneously make oﬀers to C. B
also makes an oﬀer to his current partner A,a n dt h i so ﬀer is contingent on his oﬀer to C being
rejected. The analysis of this subgame parallels that of subgame 1 so we omit it.
In the two possible sequences of bargaining (subgame 1 and subgame 2) B and C abandon
their old partners to form a new match for sure if and only if the sum of the value of the
new match and the unmatched after paying the net tax to the government exceeds the sum of








> 2Vi +2 Vj.T h e












   

−(Vi − V0 − Sk
ij)


















−(Vj − V0 − Sk
ji)

   





































































































,t h e nB
remains matched to A and is unable to use his meeting with C to extract a side-payment from A.










57It follows from the previous analysis that ﬁring taxes will in general alter the match forma-
tion and destruction decisions. Summarizing, in the single-breach situation of Figure 2, B will








in the double-breach situation of Figure 3 B and C leave their current partners if and only if









. Using the equilibrium break up rules and focusing
on a symmetric equilibrium b φ
k
ij = φk
ij, the Bellman equations are as reported in the main text.
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